Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2007

State of Utah v. Charles Moa : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Lori J. Seppi; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; Counsel for Appellant.
Ryan D. Tenney; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General; Sandi
Johnson; Salt Lake County District Attorney\'s Office; Counsel for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Moa, No. 20070940 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2007).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/577

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

Case N o . 20070940-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

Charles Moa,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
Consolidated appeal from convictions on two counts of discharging a
firearm from a vehicle, one count of aggravated assault, and one count
of failing to stop at the command of a police officer, in the Third
Judicial District Court of Utah, Salt Lake County County, the
Honorable Stephen Henriod and John Paul Kennedy presiding.
D. TENNEY (9866)
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6* Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
RYAN

LORI J. SEPPI

Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

SANDI JOHNSON

Counsel for Appellant

Counsel for Appellee

Salt Lake County District Attorney's
Office

Case N o . 20070940-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

Charles Moa,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
Consolidated appeal from convictions on two counts of discharging a
firearm from a vehicle, one count of aggravated assault, and one count
of failing to stop at the command of a police officer, in the Third
Judicial District Court of Utah, Salt Lake County County, the
Honorable Stephen Henriod and John Paul Kennedy presiding.
D. TENNEY (9866)
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
RYAN

LORI J. SEPPI
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Salt Lake County District Attorney's
Office

Counsel for Appellant

Counsel for Appellee

SANDI JOHNSON

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

1

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS

5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

13

ARGUMENT

15

I.

DEFENDANT'S PLEA WAS BOTH KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY,
AND DEFENDANT IS THEREFORE NOT ENTITLED TO
WITHDRAW HIS PLEA IN CASE -3971

15

A. Contrary to defendant's claim, rule 11 does not provide a basis for
withdrawing a plea

16

B. The trial court did not commit plain error because defendant's plea
was not obviously unknowing and involuntary. In addition,
defendant did not suffer any prejudice from the alleged error

20

1. This Court should presume that defendant's plea was knowing
and voluntary because the trial court complied with rule 11

21

2. There was no obvious error in this case, where the trial court
fully complied with rule 11, and where defendant repeatedly
informed the court that he understood the elements of the
crime to which he was pleading guilty

26

i

3. Even if the trial court committed obvious error, defendant's
plain error claim should still be rejected because defendant did
not suffer any harm
C. Defendant has not shown that Manny Garcia provided ineffective
assistance of counsel by failing to adequately investigate this case
IL THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
ORDERED DEFENDANTS SENTENCES IN CASE -4352 TO RUN
CONSECUTIVELY WITH EACH OTHER AND WITH THE
SENTENCE IN CASE-3971

30

37

42

A. The record does not support defendant's claim that the trial court
improperly considered the number of victims

42

B. The record does not support defendant's claim that the trial court
improperly considered the prior shooting

49

CONCLUSION

51

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES

Bradslww v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175 (2005)

27

Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976)

27

United States v. Bazaldua, 506 F.3d 671 (8th Cir. 2007)

11

STATE CASES

Crane v. State, 670 S.E.2d 123 (Ga. App. 2008)

39

Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516 (Utah 1994)

41

Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988 (Utah 1993)

17,26

State v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, 983 P.2d 556

2

State v. Brocksmith, 888 P.2d 703 (Utah App. 1994)

17

State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358 (Utah App. 1993)

15

State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539 (Utah App. 1998)

15

State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155 (Utah 1989)
State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, 95 P.3d 276

25
20,21, 30,31

State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44,1 P.3d 1108

16,23

State v. Gomez, 887 P.2d 853 (Utah 1994)

5

State v. Gonzales, 2005 UT App 538,127 P.3d 1252
State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12,16,40 P.3d 626

17
43,45

State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,10 P.3d 346

16

State v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566 (Utah App. 1994)

17

iii

State v. Jimenez, 2007 UT App 116,158 P.3d 1128

20, 26, 30

State v. Marble, 2007 UT App 82,157 P.3d 371

37

State v. Marshall, 2003 UT App 381

17

State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, 26 P.3d 203

23

State v. Mills, 898 P.2d 819 (Utah App. 1995)

17

State v. Montoya, 929 P.2d 356 (Utah App. 1996)
State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381 (Utah App. 1997)
State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188 (Utah 1990)

46,47
2
45

State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649 (Utah App. 1997)

43,46,47

State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666 (Utah App. 1993)

17,18,22

State v. Tliorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, 84 P.3d 854

47

State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987)

15

State v. Valdez, 2008 UT App 329,194 P.3d 195

43

State v. Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 432, 82 P.3d 1167

43,45

State v. Weaver, 2005 UT 49,122 P.3d 566

16

State v. Williams, 2006 UT App 420,147 P.3d 497

45

STATE STATUTES

Utah Code Annotated §76-3-401 (West 2004)
Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-508 (West 2004)

3,42
3, 8,29

Utah Code Annotated § 77-13-6 (West 2004)

3,17,18

Utah Code annotated § 77-18-1 (West 2004)

5

iv

Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-103 (West 2008)

1

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Floor Debate on H.B. 238

19, 21,22

v

Case No. 20070940-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

Charles Moa,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
This is a consolidated appeal from two separate cases. The case numbers are
031903971 and 071904352. For convenience, the State will refer to the cases as -3971
and -4352. The State will cite to the records as R. 3971 at

and R. 4352 at

.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
In case -3971, defendant pleaded no contest to one count of discharging a
firearm from a vehicle, a third degree felony. In case -4352, defendant pleaded
guilty to one count of discharging a firearm from a vehicle, one count of aggravated
assault, and one count of failing to stop at the command of a police officer, all third
degree felonies. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4103(2)(e) (West 2008).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did the trial court err when it denied defendant's motion to withdraw his
plea in case -3971, where defendant's counsel repeatedly discussed the plea with
defendant, defendant signed a statement attesting that he understood the elements
of the crime, and the court strictly complied with rule 11 prior to accepting the plea?
Standard of Review. "The ultimate question of whether the trial court strictly
complied with constitutional and procedural requirements for entry of a guilty plea
is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness." State v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60,
f 10, 983 R2d 556
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences
in case -4352, where defendant drove the car during a drive-by shooting in a
residential neighborhood, defendant intentionally rammed a police car during the
ensuing high speed chase, and where this crime occurred while defendant was
awaiting sentencing on the shooting at issue in case -3971?
Standard of Review. "The trial court has substantial discretion in conducting
sentencing hearings and imposing a sentence, and we will in general overturn the
trial court's sentencing decisions only if we find an abuse of discretion." State v.
Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 389 (Utah App. 1997) (citations omitted).

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, A N D RULES
Utah Code Annotated § 77-13-6 (West 2004):
(2)(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon
leave of the court and a showing that it was not knowingly and
voluntarily made.
Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-401 (West 2004):
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or
consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances
of the offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character,
and rehabilitative needs of the defendant.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Case -3971
On June 13, 2003, defendant was charged with three counts of aggravated
assault. R. 3971 at 1-3. On May 25,2007, defendant pleaded no contest to one count
of discharging a firearm from a vehicle, a violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-10508 (West 2004). R. 3971 at 71-72. At the plea hearing, the parties specified that
defendant was admitting that he had fired toward a building, which was a third
degree felony under § 76-10-508(2)(b). R. 3971 at 226: 2.1

1

Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-508 was substantively amended in 2008, but
defendant pleaded guilty under the version of the statute set forth in Utah Code
Annotated § 76-10-508 (West 2004). Unless otherwise indicated, all references to §
76-10-508 are to that version of the statute.
3

Defendant subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his plea. R. 3971 at 12729.

Following argument, the court denied that motion.

R. 3971 at 195-97.

Defendant was sentenced on October 29,2007, and timely appealed. R. 3971 at 193,
205.
Case -4352
On June 15,2007, defendant was charged with seven counts of discharging a
firearm from a vehicle, one count of aggravated assault, one count of failing to
respond to an officer's commands, and one count of failing to stop at an officer's
command. R. 4352 at 2-5. On November 13,2007, defendant pleaded guilty to one
count of discharging a firearm from a vehicle, one count of aggravated assault, and
one count of failing to stop at an officer's command. R. 4352 at 73-74. Defendant
was sentenced on January 11, 2008, and timely appealed. R. 4352 at 90-94.

4

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Case -3971 2
On April 4,2003, defendant and several friends approached a group of people
in an Office Max parking lot, told them that the "area was Glendale TCG (Tongan
Crip Gang) territory/' pulled out handguns, and fired several shots at them as they
ran away. R. 3971 at 112:3. One witness later said that "the shooters appeared to be
shooting randomly towards the crowd and towards the ground." R. 3971 at 112: 3.
Another witness told police that he heard approximately nine gunshots. R. 3971 at
112: 3. One of the bystanders was struck in the calf by a bullet. R. 3971 at 112: 3.
An arrest warrant was issued for defendant on June 13, 2003, but defendant
left the state and did not return to Utah for his initial appearance until January 2,

2

The facts in this case are taken from the PSI. R. 3971 at 112:3. Defendant did
not challenge those facts when given the opportunity to do so at his sentencing
hearing. R. 3971 at 234: 29-30. "If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the
presentence investigation report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be
considered to be waived." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(b) (West 2004). Utah courts
have accordingly accepted the factual assertions made in a PSI as true when the
defendant failed to specifically contest those assertions at sentencing. See, e.g., State
v. Gomez, 887 P.2d 853, 855 (Utah 1994).
5

2007. R. 3971 at 4-6.3 After defendant's first two public defenders were conflicted
out, James Valdez entered a notice of appearance on March 8, 2007. R. 3971 at 41.
Defendant was initially charged with three counts of aggravated assault. R.
1-3. But the State ultimately offered defendant and a co-defendant a deal: if the
defendants would plead no contest to discharging a firearm from a vehicle, the State
would recommend a suspended sentence of 0-5 years in prison, with credit for time
served, and the State would also agree to not bring additional charges stemming
from the incident. R. 3971 at 227: 4,12.
Valdez negotiated this plea agreement with the State and filled out a plea
statement in anticipation of the plea hearing. R. 3971 at 226: 5; 3971 at 227: 11.
Before defendant agreed to the deal, however, Valdez filed a motion to withdraw as
counsel. R. 55.
On April 24, 2007, Manny Garcia appeared as defendant's counsel. R. 63.
After appearing, Garcia discussed the deal with James Valdez to confirm that the
plea statement was accurate. R. 3971 at 227: 12. Garcia also discussed the plea

3

During the intervening months, defendant was charged with assault in
Washington in November 2003, obstruction of justice and vandalism in California in
May 2005, assault in Washington in June 2005, and possession of marijuana with
intent to distribute in California in November 2006. R. 3971 at 112: 6-7.
6

statement with defendant to make sure that defendant understood the agreement
R. 3971 at 227:11-12.
Defendant ultimately decided to accept the agreement. But there was a
problem: defendant's accomplice in this case had already accepted the deal and
been released from jail by the time defendant pleaded no contest. R. 3971 at 227:1214,17. Defendant had been arrested approximately 21 days after his co-defendant,
however, and the State now insisted that defendant agree to serve an additional
period in jail to bring his sentence in line with what his co-defendant had served. R.
3971 at 227: 12-14, 17. Defendant wanted to get out of jail that day, however, so
Garcia approached the prosecution and negotiated an amended agreement: the
underlying sentence would be changed from 0-5 years to 3-5 years, and defendant
would agree to a PSI before sentencing; in exchange, the State would agree that
defendant could be released that day, rather than serving the extra time required to
bring his sentence in line with his co-defendant's. R. 3971 at 227: 12-14. The
prosecution also agreed that it would not be filing any "related charges." R. 3971 at
75. Garcia discussed these alterations with defendant, and defendant specifically
agreed to them. R. 3971 at 227:13-14.
On May 25,2007, defendant appeared in court and entered his plea. R. 3971
at 71-72. Defendant submitted a written plea statement in support of his plea. R.
7

3971 at 75-82. The plea statement repeatedly identified the offense to which
defendant was pleading no contest, both by name and its code designation. R. 3971
at 75-76. Immediately above one such reference, defendant stated: "I understand
the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no
contest)/ 7 R. 3971 at 76. Defendant then twice confirmed that he was "admitting
that [he] committed the crimes listed above." R. 3971 at 76, 78.
Defendant's statement also confirmed that he had consulted with his attorney
before his plea. Defendant stated: "My attorney and I have fully discussed this
statement, my rights, and the consequences of my guilty (or no contest) plea(s)." R.
3971 at 77. Defendant and Garcia both signed the statement. R. 3971 at 80.
At the sentencing hearing, the parties explained the plea to the court. At one
point in the hearing, the court asked counsel "[w]hat section will he be charged
under, do you know?" R. 3971 at 226:4. The prosecutor responded that it would be
"[s]ection 76-10, I believe it's 508, isn't it counsel?" R. 3971 at 226: 4-5. Garcia
responded by saying "I honestly don't know. I looked at it a few days ago and I did
not write it down, Judge." R. 3971 at 226: 5. The prosecutor then confirmed that
defendant was pleading no contest to violating Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-508.
R. 3971 at 226: 6.

8

The trial court conducted a rule 11 colloquy in which it confirmed that
defendant was sober and not acting under any compulsion, as well as that
defendant understood his rights and potential punishments. R. 3971 at 226: 6-9.
When the court asked defendant if he had any questions, defendant had none
regarding the crime to which he was pleading.

R. 3971 at 226: 10.

Instead,

defendant said that his only concern was that there would be "no other prosecution
after this. That's all I wanted to know." R. 3971 at 226:10-11. The court accepted
defendant's plea. R. 3971 at 226: 6-10.
Shortly after the plea, the prosecution filed charges against defendant for
witness tampering. R. 3971 at 227: 6-7. Although those charges were subsequently
dropped, R. 3971 at 227: 6-7; R. 3971 at 234:20, defendant wrote several handwritten
letters to the court asking for leave to withdraw his plea. R. 3971 at 101-06. In those
letters, defendant complained about the retaliation charge and claimed that he had
not approved the alterations to the plea agreement. R. 3971 at 101-06.
On July 31,2007, Garcia filed a motion to withdraw as defendant's counsel. R.
3971 at 107-08. Defendant's new counsel appeared on August 21, 2007, and filed a
motion to withdraw defendant's plea that same day. R. 3971 at 124-28. In that
motion, defendant again claimed that the plea was invalid because of the alterations
to the plea and the subsequent retaliation charge. R. 3971 at 127-28. Defendant did
9

not mention rule 11, nor did he ever claim that he had not understood the elements
of the charge to which he had pleaded. R. 3971 at 127-28.
On October 5, 2007, the trial court held a hearing on defendant's motion to
withdraw his plea. R. 3971 at 227:1-24. During that hearing, defendant agreed that
his motion was limited to the plea alterations and the retaliation charge, and he
therefore stipulated that rule 11 was not at issue.

R. 3971 at 227: 7, 18-19.

Defendant likewise agreed that because the retaliation charge had been dismissed, it
was no longer at issue. R. 3971 at 227: 6-7. Given this, the trial court's written ruling
ultimately concluded that the parties had "stipulated that the plea taken on May 25,
2007, was taken in compliance with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure." R. 3971 at 195. The court then rejected defendant's motion on its
merits. R. 3971 at 195-97; R. 3971 at 227: 20-22.
Case -4352 4
While awaiting sentencing on the shooting at issue in case -3971, defendant
was involved in another shooting, this time in a residential neighborhood. In this
shooting, defendant drove into a Salt Lake City neighborhood at 5 a.m., after which

4

The PSI in case -4352 is located in a non-paginated manila folder. The State
will cite to it as R. 4352 at PSI: . As with the PSI in case -3971, defendant did not
challenge the accuracy of the facts contained in this PSI prior to sentencing, and
those facts are therefore accepted as true.
10

one of his passengers "began shooting" from the vehicle at a neighborhood house.
R. 4352 at PSI: 3. Officers later found "several bullet holes in a vehicle" that was
parked in front of a home. R. 4352 at PSI: 3-4.
Two citizens saw the shooting occur, and one of them followed defendant as
he left the neighborhood. R. 4352 at PSI: 3. Officers subsequently joined the pursuit
and "attempted to perform a traffic stop on the vehicle." R. 4352 at PSI: 3. That
attempt failed, and defendant then led "officers on a high-speed chase at speeds
reaching 125 to 130 mph. During the police chase [defendant] intentionally crashed
head-on into one of the patrol vehicles and continued to flee. Officers eventually
forced [defendant] to stop using the 'pit maneuver/" R. 4352 at PSI: 3.5
After defendant's vehicle was stopped, defendant fled on foot. R. 4352 at PSI:
4. Defendant ignored officers' commands to stop, and officers had to tase him twice
before they were able to arrest him. R. 4352 at PSI: 4.

5

A pit maneuver "is a method used by police to force a pursued vehicle to
abruptly turn sideways to the direction of travel, by bumping the back side of
the pursued vehicle with the police vehicle, causing the fleeing driver to lose
control and stop. 'PIT' stands for either 'Precision Immobilization Technique/
'Pursuit Intervention Technique/ or 'Parallel Immobilization Technique/
depending on the police department using it." United States v. Bazaldua, 506 F.3d
671, 673 n.2 (8th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).
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Defendant was initially charged with seven counts of discharging a firearm
from a vehicle, one count of aggravated assault, one count of failing to respond to an
officer's commands, and one count of failing to stop at an officer's command. R.
4352 at 2-5. On November 13, 2007, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of
discharging a firearm from a vehicle, one count of aggravated assault, and one count
of failing to stop at an officer's command. R. 4352 at 73-74.
Defendant was sentenced on January 11,2008. R. 4352 at 122:1-7. During the
sentencing hearing, the prosecutor offered "to give a little bit of background as to
what occurred at this home." R. 4352 at 122:5. The prosecutor explained that there
had been a prior shooting at the home earlier in the year in which a young girl had
been hit. R. 4352 at 122: 5. After relating the facts of the shooting at issue here, the
prosecutor argued that defendant is "extremely dangerous." R. 4352 at 122: 6. The
prosecutor further explained that" [t]here's not just one victim in this case. This is a
whole neighborhood who had multiple shootings, and finally got Mr. Moa because
the citizens were willing to step up and put their own lives in danger." R. 4352 at
122: 6. Defendant did not object to any of these statements.
The court sentenced defendant and ordered his sentences to

run

consecutively, both to each other and to any other sentences defendant had from
other cases. R. 4352 at 122: 7. The court explained its ruling by simply stating that
12

defendant is "an extreme danger to any community that he happens to be in." R.
4352 at 122: 6.
SUMMARY OF A R G U M E N T
Point I: Defendant claims the trial court did not strictly comply with rule 11,
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, when it took his plea in case -3971. As a result of
this alleged violation, defendant asks this Court to either reduce his sentence or
instead allow him to withdraw his plea. This claim should be rejected for three
reasons.
First, contrary to defendant's claim, a defendant is not entitled to withdraw a
plea based only on a technical rule 11 violation. Instead, a defendant is only entitled
to withdraw a plea if the plea was entered unknowingly and involuntarily.
Defendant's claim in this case is therefore predicated on an incorrect legal standard.
Second, there was no plain error in this case because defendant's plea was not
obviously unknowing and involuntary. During the proceedings below, defendant
repeatedly confirmed that the trial court had complied with rule 11, thereby creating
a presumption that the plea was proper. The record confirms this, conclusively
showing that defendant understood both the nature of the charges and the likely
consequences of his plea. Moreover, defendant has not been prejudiced because he
has not shown that he would not have pleaded had the elements all been recited at
13

the sentencing hearing. Defendant therefore should not be granted relief in this
case.
Third, defendant's ineffective assistance claim should also be rejected.
Contrary to defendant's claim, the record shows that defendant's counsel did
investigate the case prior to the plea hearing, and it also shows that defendant's
counsel discussed the charges with defendant before the hearing.

Moreover,

defendant has not shown that he would not have pleaded but for the alleged errors.
Point II: Defendant next claims that the trial court abused its discretion by
ordering his sentences in case -4352 to run consecutively to each other and to the
charges at issue in case -3971. Defendant specifically claims that the court erred by
improperly considering two statements made by the prosecutor during the
sentencing hearing.
Contrary to defendant's claim, however, the record does not show that the
trial court considered either statement as a basis for its sentencing decision. The
record instead shows that the court ordered defendant's sentences to run
consecutively because of defendant's dangerous character. This decision was amply
supported by the indiscriminate, violent nature of the charged offenses, as well as
by defendant's extensive criminal history. Defendant's claim therefore fails.

14

ARGUMENT
I.
DEFENDANTS PLEA WAS BOTH KNOWING AND
VOLUNTARY, AND DEFENDANT IS THEREFORE NOT
ENTITLED TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA IN CASE -3971
Defendant claims that his plea was invalid because the trial court did not
comply with rule 11 during the plea colloquy. Aplt. Br. 18-37. According to
defendant, the trial court specifically violated rule 11 by failing to inform defendant
that the crime of discharging a firearm from a vehicle contained an intent element.
Aplt. Br. 20-29. Defendant then claims that he would not have pleaded guilty had
he been informed about this particular element. Aplt. Br. 31-33.
"A general rule of appellate review . . . is that a contemporaneous objection
or some form of specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the
trial record before an appellate court will review such claim on appeal/' State v.
Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987). 'The objection must be specific enough to
give the trial court notice of the very error of which counsel complains." State v.
Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 546 (Utah App. 1998) (quotations and citation omitted). The
purpose of this requirement is to afford the lower courts an "opportunity to correct
the errors if appropriate/' State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah App. 1993)
(quotations and citation omitted). "To serve these policies,... the preservation rule

15

applies to every claim, including constitutional questions, unless a defendant can
demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred." State v.
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ 11,10 P.3d 346 (citations omitted). In addition, courts can
also review unpreserved claims if the lack of preservation was due to ineffective
assistance of counsel. State v. Weaver, 2005 UT 49,118,122 P.3d 566.
Defendant acknowledges that he did not raise this claim below, but
nevertheless argues that this error can be reviewed for either plain error or
ineffective assistance of counsel. Aplt. Br. 29-37. Defendant's claim should be
rejected for three reasons. First, contrary to defendant's claim, rule 11 does not
provide a basis for withdrawing a plea. Second, there was no plain error in this case
because defendant understood the elements of the crime to which he was pleading.
Third, defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel because his
attorney did not perform deficiently.
A. Contrary to defendant's claim, rule 11 does not provide a basis for
withdrawing a plea.
"A 'withdrawal of a plea of guilty is a privilege, not a r i g h t . . . [and] is within
the sound discretion of the trial court.'" State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, ^| 9,1 P.3d
1108 (quoting State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040, 1041 (Utah 1987)). Once a plea is

16

entered, a defendant is only entitled to withdraw the plea if he shows that the plea
was taken in violation of either his constitutional or statutory rights.
Under the constitutional standard, a defendant's plea can be withdrawn if it
was unknowingly or involuntarily entered. See, e.g., Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988,
992 (Utah 1993); State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 670-72 (Utah App. 1993). This
standard requires that a defendant receive "real notice of the true nature of the
charge against him, the first and most universally recognized requirement of due
process/' Salazar, 852 P.2d at 991. Moreover, a defendant must also be informed of
"the direct consequences of [his] guilty plea/ 7 State v. Marshall, 2003 UT App 381,^f
21 n. 9 (quotations, citations, and emphasis omitted); accord State v. Gonzales, 2005
UT App 5 3 8 , \ 8,127 P.3d 1252.
The statutory standard for withdrawing a plea is set forth in Utah Code
Annotated § 77-13-6 (West 2004). Prior to 2003, this statute allowed a defendant to
withdraw a plea for "good cause." See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (West 2004),
Historical and Statutory Notes. Utah courts interpreted this good cause standard to
include rule 11 violations. State v. Mills, 898 P.2d 819,821-22 (Utah App. 1995); State
v. Brocksmith, 888 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566,
569 (Utah App. 1994).
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The pre-2003 statutory standard was therefore distinct from the constitutional
standard, which did not depend on whether the trial court had strictly complied
with rule 11. See Stilling, 856 P.2d at 671; Salazar, 851 P.2d at 991-92. In Salazar, for
example, the supreme court held that the knowing and voluntary standard sets
forth a "more limited" inquiry than that which is required by rule 11, and "a failure
to comply with Utah's rule 11 in taking a guilty plea" therefore "does not" render a
plea unknowing and involuntary. Id. at 992.
In 2003, however, the Utah Legislature removed the "good cause" provision
from § 77-13-6 and replaced it with the constitutional standard. Under the current
statute, a plea can now be withdrawn "only upon leave of the court and a showing
that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6.
As indicated by the plain language of the statute, the 2003 amendment was
designed to align the statutory standard with the constitutional standard. The
amendment's legislative history supports this view. When the amendment was
presented to the Legislature, its two legislative sponsors both explained that the
constitutional standard would now become the statutory standard as well. When
Representative Katherine Bryson, the bill's primary sponsor, introduced the bill to
the Utah House of Representatives, she explained its purpose as follows:
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The current statute permits the withdrawal of a guilty plea only upon
good cause s h o w n . . . . What the constitution requires is that the plea
be made knowingly and voluntarily, and rule 11 should actually create
a safe harbor and not be the standard by which withdrawal is
determined. [H.B.] 238 would correct some problems by permitting
defendants to withdraw their pleas only on a showing that the plea
was not knowing and voluntary. It's a constitutional standard and the
standard on post-conviction challenges.
Representative Katherine Bryson, Floor Debate on H.B. 238,2003 Utah Legislature,
February

28, 2003, audio

file

located

at

http://le.utah.gov/asp/audio/

index.asp?House=H.
When Senator David Gladwell introduced the bill to the Utah Senate, he
further explained that this amendment was intended to ensure that rule 11 could not
serve as the basis for withdrawing a plea. Senator Gladwell explained that although
rule 11 requires a judge to
recite all of the rights that a defendant would give up if the defendant
were to plead guilty,... the only thing the constitution requires is that
a plea be made knowingly and voluntarily. Hence, the statute itself
will be changed to simply show that the court may allow a defendant
to withdraw his or her plea upon a showing that it was not knowingly
and voluntarily made.
Senator David Gladwell, Floor Debate on H.B. 238,2003 Utah Legislature, March 4,
2003, audio file located at http://le.utah.gov/asp/audio/index.asp?House=S.
In this case, defendant claims that the trial court violated rule 11 during the
plea colloquy, and he accordingly requests leave to withdraw his plea. Under the
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current statute, however, rule 11 no longer provides any basis for the requested
relief. Thus, defendant is incorrect when he claims that the alleged rule 11 violation
supports his request to withdraw his plea.
B. The trial court did not commit plain error because defendant's plea
was not obviously unknowing and involuntary. In addition,
defendant did not suffer any prejudice from the alleged error.
Although defendant incorrectly bases his claim on rule 11, defendant also
concomitantly claims that his plea was unknowing and involuntary due to the
court's alleged error. Aplt. Br. 18-29. Defendant acknowledges that this claim is
unpreserved, but nevertheless asks this Court to conclude that there was plain error.
Aplt. Br. 29-33.
"' [T]o establish the existence of plain error and to obtain appellate relief from
an alleged error that was not properly objected to, the appellant must show the
following: (i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial
court; and (iii) the error is harmful/ 77 State v. Jimenez, 2007 UT App 116, ^f 10,158
P.3d 1128 (citation omitted). In order to show that an error was harmful, the
defendant must demonstrate a "'reasonable probability that, but for [the] errors, he
[or she] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'"
State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, \ 22,95 P.3d 276 (citation omitted). Thus, the error "must
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have 'affected the outcome of the plea process/" which includes a showing that,
"'but for' the alleged error, [defendant] would not have pled guilty." Id.
Defendant's claim should be rejected for three reasons. First, the record
shows that the trial court complied with rule 11; as a result, there is a presumption
that defendant's plea was knowing and voluntary. Second, defendant has not
shown that there was obvious error in this case, where the trial court fully complied
with rule 11, and where defendant repeatedly informed the court that he
understood the elements of the crime to which he was pleading guilty. Third, even
if this alleged error should have been obvious, the record also does not support
defendant's claim that he would not have pleaded guilty but for the error.
1. This Court should presume that defendant's plea was
knowing and voluntary because the trial court complied with
rule 11.
As explained above, a rule 11 violation by itself no longer provides a basis for
withdrawing a guilty plea. But this is not to say that rule 11 has no place in the
current withdrawal analysis.
When introducing the 2003 amendment to the Utah House of Representatives,
Representative Katherine Bryson stated that rule 11 would now act as a "safe
harbor" against subsequent motions to withdraw guilty pleas.

Representative

Katherine Bryson, Floor Debate on H.B. 238, 2003 Utah Legislature, February 28,
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2003, audio file located at http://le.utah.gov/asp/audio/index.asp?House=H.
When introducing the bill to the Utah Senate, Senator Gladwell explained what this
meant. According to Senator Gladwell, ''rule 11 is still in force. Judges will still use
rule 11 to identify those rights given up by a defendant and it will continue to be a
safe harbor if... all of those rights are accurately recited/' Senator David Gladwell,
Floor Debate on H.B. 238,2003 Utah Legislature, March 4,2003, audio file located at
http://le.utah.gov/asp/audio/index. asp?House=S.
The sponsors' joint description of rule 11 as a "safe harbor provision" was
significant A safe harbor "affords protection from liability or penalty." Black's
Law Dictionary, Safe Harbor (8th ed. 2004).

As explained above, the 2003

amendment was expressly designed to prevent defendants from withdrawing a
guilty plea based only on technical rule 11 violations. Thus, the clear implication
was that while rule 11 violations would no longer support withdrawal of a plea, rule
11 compliance would still "afford[ ] protection" for the plea if the plea was attacked
on other grounds. Black's Law Dictionary, Safe Harbor (8th ed. 2004).
This suggestion is consistent with Utah courts' longstanding treatment of rule
11. As explained above, the knowing and voluntary standard is not dependant on
strict rule 11 compliance. See Stilling, 856 P.2d at 671; Salazar, 851 P.2d at 991-92. But
even under the pre-2003 cases, the supreme court has held that a trial court's rule 11
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compliance creates a presumption that the plea was entered knowingly and
voluntarily. See State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, f 22, 26 P.3d 203; State v. Gamblin,
2000 UT 44, Tf 11,1 P.3d 1108. Thus, while a trial court's rule 11 violation no longer
provides a basis for withdrawing a guilty plea, a trial court's rule 11 compliance still
protects the validity of the plea by creating a presumption that the plea was
knowingly and voluntarily entered.
During the proceeding below, defendant expressly stipulated that the trial
court had complied with rule 11 prior to accepting his plea. When defendant filed
his motion to withdraw his plea, he only argued that the plea should be withdrawn
based on the alterations to the plea agreement and the filing of the retaliation
charge. R. 3971 at 127-28. But he never claimed that the trial court had violated rule
11, either in the letters he personally mailed to the court following his plea, or in the
motion that he filed after obtaining new counsel. R. 3971 at 101-07,127-28.
The trial court subsequently held a hearing on defendant's motion. At the
beginning of that hearing, the prosecutor sought confirmation that rule 11 was not
at issue, thus leading to the following exchange:
[Prosecutor]: And your Honor, it's also my understanding that the
defendant is not challenging that the plea was taken in compliance
with Rule 11, that he is merely going for the fact that the plea was
changed, what he thought it was, but that the plea colloquy that the
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Court went through and the plea form that was submitted and that he
signed was, in fact, accurate and taken in accordance with Rule 11.
[Defense counsel]: From —from my perspective, that's correct, your
Honor. That was never an allegation that Mr. Moa made to me.
R.3971 at227: 7.
Given this stipulation, the prosecutor did not address the question of whether
rule 11 had been followed, either during her opening argument or during her
questioning of defendant's previous counsel. R. 3971 at 227: 7-18. During closing
arguments, the prosecutor then argued that the court's rule 11 compliance created a
presumption that the plea was knowing and voluntary. R. 3971 at 227:18. Defense
did not respond to this by challenging the court's rule 11 compliance, but instead
again insisted that rule 11 was not at issue: "The only thing I could respond to that,
Judge, is, clearly, Mr. Moa has never alleged that you didn't follow Rule 11 in this
case." R.3971 at 227: 19. Given this, the trial court's written ruling ultimately
concluded that the parties had "stipulated that the plea taken on May 25,2007, was
taken in compliance with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure." R. 3971
at 195. Defendant did not ever object to that conclusion below.
Although defendant now claims that the trial court's alleged rule 11 violation
was plain error, plain error review is unavailable when a party has affirmatively
waived a claim. "[W]e do not appraise all rulings objected to for the first time on
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appeal under the plain error doctrine. For example, if trial counsel's actions
amounted to an active, as opposed to a passive, waiver of an objection, we may
decline to consider the claim of plain error." State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155,158 (Utah
1989). As explained above, defendant repeatedly stated that rule 11 was not an
issue during the proceedings below.

This stipulation had a very practical

consequence, insofar as it led the prosecutor to refrain from presenting evidence on
the point during the hearing on the motion to withdraw. Defendant's rule 11 claim
is therefore barred by the doctrine of invited error. 6

6

In any event, the record shows that the trial court had a thorough discussion
with defendant prior to accepting the plea, thereby supporting defendant's
stipulation. Prior to accepting defendant's plea, the court ensured that defendant
understood the crime to which he was pleading (R. 3971 at 226: 2-4), his obligations
with respect to AP&P (R. 3971 at 226: 2-4), and the process by which the original
information was being amended (R. 3971 at 226: 5). The court confirmed that
defendant was not under the influence of any drugs or alcohol, that defendant was
not receiving treatment for any illness, and that defendant was sufficiently educated
to understand the proceedings. R. 3971 at 226: 6. The court ensured that defendant
understood the factual predicate for the offense. R. 3971 at 226: 6. The court then
conducted a thorough rule 11 colloquy, during which it advised defendant of the
presumption of innocence, his right to plead not guilty, his right to a speedy public
trial before a fair, unbiased, impartial jury, the State's burden of proof, defendant's
right to appointed counsel, his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, his
right to remain silent, and his right to appeal. R. 3971 at 226: 7-8.
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In sum, the record shows that the trial court complied with rule 11 w h e n it
accepted defendant's plea. As a result, this Court should presume that defendant's
plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered.
2. There was no obvious error in this case, where the trial court
fully complied with rule 11, and where defendant repeatedly
informed the court that he understood the elements of the
crime to which he was pleading guilty.
A defendant cannot obtain relief under the plain error doctrine by simply
showing that the trial court erred; instead, a defendant can only obtain relief by
showing that the trial court committed an error that"should have been obvious to
the trial court." Jimenez, 2007 UT App 116, % 10. Although defendant now claims
that he did not understand the elements of the crime at the time of his plea, Aplt. Br.
20-29, the record does not support this claim, let alone show that the error should
have been obvious to the trial court.
When a defendant claims that a plea was unknowing and involuntary, a
"court considering such a claim is not limited to the record of the plea hearing."
Salazar, 852 P.2d at 992. Instead, compliance with rule 11 "shall be determined by
examining the record as a whole." Utah R. Crim. P. 11(1). Additionally, "the
constitutional prerequisites of a valid plea may be satisfied where the record
accurately reflects that the nature of the charge and the elements of the crime were
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explained to the defendant by his own competent counsel.'7 Bradslmw v. Stumpf, 545
U.S. 175, 183 (2005). Thus, "[w]here a defendant is represented by competent
counsel, the court may usually rely on that counsel's assurance that the defendant
has been properly informed of the nature and elements of the charge to which he is
pleading guilty." Id.; see also Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 647 (1976) (noting
that "even without such express representation, it may be appropriate to presume
that in most cases defense counsel routinely explain the nature of the offense in
sufficient detail to give the accused notice of what he is being asked to a d m i t " ) .
Defendant was originally charged with three counts of aggravated assault,
but ultimately pleaded to one count of discharging a firearm from a vehicle. R. 3971
at 1-3, 71-72. Defendant signed a statement in support of his plea. That statement
not only identified the crime at issue by name, but it also listed the specific code
provision in two different places. R. 3971 at 75-76. Immediately above one such
reference, defendant stated: "I understand the nature and the elements ofcrime(s) to
which I am pleading guilty (or no contest)." R. 3971 at 76 (emphasis added).
Defendant then twice confirmed that he was "admitting that [he] committed the
crimes listed above." R. 3971 at 76, 78.
At the plea hearing, Manny Garcia explained that although he was not
defendant's attorney when the deal was negotiated, he had discussed the plea with
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defendant.

R. 3971 at 226: 5. Garcia explained that while James Valdez "had

already arranged this . . . I just reiterated it all and have gone over it again" with
defendant. R. 3971 at 226: 5. Defendant then agreed that those conversations had
actually occurred. R. 3971 at 226: 6. In the subsequent hearing on defendant's
motion to withdraw his plea, Garcia reiterated that he had discussed the charge
with defendant prior to defendant's plea:
Q: Did you go over that form with Mr. Moa?
A: I did.
Q: On May 25th of this year?
A: I did.
Q: Specifically addressing tlie clwrge of discltarging a firearm?
A: Yes.
R. 3971 at 227: 11-12 (emphasis added). In denying defendant's motion, the trial
court accordingly stated that he was "impressed with Mr. Garcia's efforts to make
sure that his client understood what was going on." R. 3971 at 227: 21.
The plea hearing transcript further confirms that defendant understood the
charge to which he was pleading. At the beginning of that hearing, the prosecutor
reiterated that defendant was pleading to "Discharge of a Firearm, 3rd Degree
Felony." R. 3971 at 226:1. The prosecutor and defense counsel agreed that that crime
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was set fortli in Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-508. R. 3971 at 226: 4-5. Prior to
accepting the plea, the court then determined that defendant was pleading to the
variant set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-508(2)(b), which occurs when a
defendant fires toward a building:
l #
o

THE COURT: So as I understand what you said is he will be pleading
guilty to a 3rd Degree Felony, Unlawful Discharge of a Firearm.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Toward a building, yes.
THE COURT: Toward a building and the other charges will be
dismissed; is that correct?
[PROSECUTOR]: Yes.
R. 3971 at 226:2. By statute, that variant of the crime requires the defendant to have
the "intent to intimidate or harass another or with intent to damage a habitable
structure/ 7 Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508(2)(b).
Thus, although the record shows that trial court did not specifically recite all
of the elements of the crime during the plea hearing, the record shows that
defendant understood what he was pleading to. Two attorneys discussed the plea
agreement with defendant, defendant's agreement repeatedly identified the crime to
which defendant was pleading, and defendant's current attorney "specifically
address [ed] the charge of discharging a firearm" with defendant prior to the plea.
R. 3971 at 227: 11-12. Moreover, the trial court conducted a thorough rule 11
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colloquy with defendant prior to accepting his plea, and defendant submitted a
sworn statement to the court declaring that he understood "the nature and tlie
elements of crime(s) to which" he was pleading. R. 3971 at 76 (emphasis added).
As discussed above, defendant can only prevail on this claim if he shows that
there was an error in this case and that the error should have been obvious to the
trial court.

In addition, this claim is evaluated in light of the rule 11-based

presumption that the plea was knowing and voluntary.

Given defendant's

discussions with counsel, his sworn statement, and his interactions with the court at
the plea hearing, this Court should reject defendant's claim that this plea was
obviously unknowing and involuntary.
3. Even if the trial court committed obvious error, defendant's
plain error claim should still be rejected because defendant
did not suffer any harm.
In order to prevail on a plain error claim, a defendant must also show that the
error was harmful. Jimenez, 2007 UT App 116, ^f 10. In order to show that an alleged
error was harmful, the defendant must show that there was a "'reasonable
probability that, but for [the] errors, he [or she] would not have pleaded guilty and
would have insisted on going to trial.'" Dean, 2004 UT 63, f 22 (citation omitted).
Thus, the error "must have 'affected the outcome of the plea process,'" which
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includes a showing that, "'but for' the alleged error, [defendant] would not have
pled guilty." Id.
In this case, even if this error should have been obvious to the trial court, the
record still does not support defendant's claim that he would not have pleaded had
he understood the intent element of the crime at issue.
Defendant and a co-defendant were both initially charged with three second
degree felonies. R. 3971 at 1-3. The State ultimately offered both defendants the
same deal: plead no contest to the third degree felony of discharging a firearm from
a vehicle; in exchange, the State would recommend a suspended sentence of 0-5
years in prison and the State would also agree to not bring additional charges on
any related case. R. 3971 at 227: 4,12. This was a good deal for defendant, and it
saved him from potentially facing years in prison if he were convicted of the three
second degree felonies at issue.
As explained above, however, the deal was amended when the State insisted
that defendant serve an additional period in jail to equalize his sentence with that of
his co-defendant R. 3971 at 227:12-14. Under the amended deal, defendant agreed
to a 3-5 year suspended sentence, rather than a 0-5 year sentence, and he also agreed
to submit to a PSI prior to sentencing. R. 3971 at 227:12-14.
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The reason for this change is well established in the record. During the initial
plea hearing, defendant asked the court for confirmation that "I'll be released today
for sure?" R. 3971 at 226: 14. During the hearing on defendant's motion to
withdraw his plea, Garcia explained that defendant only agreed to the amended
deal —and thus the pronounced enhancement to his potential prison sentence—
because defendant "wanted to get out of jail that day." R. 3971 at 227:12; see also R.
3971 at 227:13 ("He wanted to get out of jail that day and so I went back and talked
to Vince about what deal could we make so that he could get out that day."). During
cross-examination, Garcia again explained that defendant was going to accept the
original deal "until he realized he wasn't going to get out that day and then that's
when the deal changed." R. 3971 at 227:17. Thus:
Q: So the only reason this changed, as far as you're concerned was so
you could get Charles out of jail that— that day of the plea?
A: Yes.
Q: And that's why the change occurred?
A: Yes.
R. 3971 at 227: 17. Garcia again reiterated this point at a separate hearing,
explaining that the amended plea was "exactly what he was anticipating, and really
his biggest concern . .. was he wanted to get out of jail." R. 3971 at 234:17-18.
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The record therefore demonstrates that defendant did not accept the amended
deal because it fit his understanding of what he had done. Rather, defendant
accepted this particular plea because it not only saved him from potentially
spending years in prison, but also because it allowed him to be released from prison
on May 25, 2007. Defendant's specific release date ultimately proved to be the
critical point, not the intent element of the crime to which he was pleading.
In response, defendant nevertheless argues that his pro se motions to
withdraw his plea in the weeks following the plea hearing show that he would not
have pleaded no contest to the offense had he been properly informed of the
elements. Aplt Br. 31. While the record does show that defendant was concerned
about his plea following the hearing, the record does not support his claim that this
concern had anything to do with the elements of the crime to which he had pleaded.
In those pro se motions, defendant never mentioned the elements of the crime. R.
3971 at 101-09. Instead, defendant only complained about (1) the retaliation charge
that had been filed against him, and (2) the alterations to the plea agreement. R.
3971 at 101-06.
The prosecution subsequently dropped the retaliation charge, however, and
defendant has not raised any issue relating to it on appeal. R. 3971 at 227: 6-7; R.
3971 at 234: 20. That charge is therefore not at issue.
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With respect to the plea alterations, defendant not only agreed to those
alterations, but he also received a direct benefit from them. As explained above,
those alterations ultimately allowed defendant to be released from jail on March 25,
which was the most critical term for him. R. 3971 at 227:17.
More importantly, those alterations did not purport to change the underlying
offense; instead, those alterations only changed the scope of the suspended sentence.
Thus, even if it were true that defendant did not consent to those alterations, the
particular concerns expressed in the letters still had nothing to do with the elements
of the crime, and therefore do not support his claim on appeal that he would not
have pleaded guilty had he understood those elements.
Defendant next suggests that because he had concerns about the intent
element in case -4352, that supports his claim that he would not have pleaded to the
crime in case -3971 had he understood the elements. Aplt. Br. 31-32. This argument
assumes too much.
Contrary to defendant's claim, the fact that defendant was concerned about
the intent element in case -4352 does not automatically mean that defendant was
likewise concerned in case -3971. The reason for this is that these two pleas were
taken under very different circumstances. Defendant pleaded no contest in case
-3971 on May 25, 2007. R. 3971 at 226:1-15. At that time, the agreement was that
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defendant would receive a suspended sentence. R. 3971 at 226:1-2. By the time of
sentencing, however, the court had received the PSI, which contained a detailed
recitation of defendant's criminal background, and defendant had also been arrested
in case -4352. When defendant appeared for sentencing in case -3971 on October
29, 2007, the court therefore sentenced him to prison. R. 3971 at 234: 29-35.
Defendant did not plead guilty in case -4352 until November 13, 2007,
however, which was two weeks after he had been sent to prison in case -3971.
Thus, when defendant pleaded guilty in case -4352, he was in a radically different
position than he was in when he pleaded no contest in case -3971. While the earlier
plea had presumed that defendant would not be sent to prison, this subsequent plea
was entered while defendant was already in prison.

Defendant would have

understood that he was facing pronounced possibility of serving prison time based
on the plea in case -4352, which would have therefore given him a greater incentive
to scrutinize the exact details of that plea.
Moreover, even if defendant had been in a similar position when he pleaded
guilty in the two separate cases, his decision to plead guilty in the second case
refutes his claim that he would not have pleaded guilty in the first case.
As explained above, defendant was charged with being the driver during a
drive-by shooting in case -4352. R. 4352 at 2-6. During the plea hearing in that case,
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defendant admitted that he was driving the car with a friend, and he also admitted
that he "made a U-turn to shoot in there." R. 4352 at 121: 9. Upon further
questioning, however, defendant denied that the reason he had driven "over there
with the guy with the gun was to intimidate somebody."

R. 4352 at 121: 10.

Defendant explained: "It wasn't to intimidate. It was just discharge the firearm."
R. 4352 at 121:11. Although the trial court then informed defendant that it would
"infer intimidation from that" and still enter a plea of guilty, defendant did not
object. R. 4352 at 121:11. Instead, defendant agreed to plead to guilty. R. 4352 at
121:11-12.
Thus, although this record does show that defendant was concerned about the
intent element in case -4352, it also shows that this concern was not serious enough
to prevent him from pleading guilty to the crime. Thus, insofar as defendant was
not concerned enough about the intent element in case -4352 to actually reject the
plea agreement, there is no basis for concluding that that same level of concern
would have prevented him from likewise pleading guilty in case -3971. This is
particularly true where defendant got what he bargained for in case -3971:
immediate release from jail.
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Defendant therefore has not shown that he was prejudiced by the alleged
error, and this Court should therefore reject defendant's request to overturn his plea
based on plain error.
C. Defendant has not shown that Manny Garcia provided ineffective
assistance of counsel by failing to adequately investigate this case.
Defendant also claims that his unpreserved claim can be reviewed for
ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant specifically argues that Manny Garcia
failed to conduct a reasonable investigation into the merits of his claim, and that this
failure then prevented Garcia from ensuring that defendant understood the
elements of the crime. Aplt. Br. 33-37.
In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant
must show (1) "that counsel's performance was objectively deficient," and (2) that
"a reasonable probability exists that but for the deficient conduct defendant would
have obtained a more favorable outcome at trial." State v. Marble, 2007 UT App 82,
f 8,157 P.3d 371. Defendant has not satisfied either prong.
First, defendant has not shown that Garcia performed deficiently. In order to
show deficient performance, a defendant "must overcome the strong presumption
that his trial counsel rendered adequate assistance, by persuading the court that
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there was no conceivable tactical basis for counsels actions/' Id. at ^f 11 (quotations and
citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
In this case, defendant claims that Manny Garcia "did not separately
investigate the nature and elements of the offense or the factual basis/ 7 Aplt. Br. 35.
As support for this claim, defendant points out that Garcia (1) used a plea statement
that had been prepared by prior counsel, and (2) could not name the specific code
section at issue when asked for it during the plea hearing. Aplt. Br. 36.
As a threshold matter, defendant is incorrect when he suggests that there was
something improper about Garcia's decision to initially rely on the work performed
by James Valdez. Contrary to defendant's claim, successor counsel is not required
to start from scratch when assuming representation midway through a case. In State
v. Classon, this Court recognized while the Sixth Amendment is violated when "no
lawyer accepts actual responsibility for preparation and defense of the case," this
does not mean that "more than one lawyer may not fulfill this responsibility
simultaneously, or sequentially/'

935 P.2d 524, 534 (Utah App. 1997) (emphasis

added). In United States v. Ciancaglini, a federal district court similarly held that "if
evidence can be quickly gathered from other sources, such as other defense counsel
in the matter, less personal investigation by counsel is not dispositive" to an
ineffective assistance claim. 945 F.Supp. 813, 819 (E.D.Pa. 1996); see also Crane v.
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State, 670 S.E.2d 123, 125-26 (Ga. App. 2008) (denying a Sixth Amendment claim
where successor counsel had become "familiar" with the case by reviewing "the
trial preparation work performed" by defendant's original counsel).
In any event, although it is true that Garcia used a plea statement that had
been prepared by James Valdez, it is not true that Garcia failed to conduct any
independent investigation of the case. During the hearing below, Garcia testified
that he had discussed the deal with James Valdez before the plea hearing to confirm
that the plea statement was accurate. R. 3971 at 227:12. Garcia also stated that he
discussed the plea with defendant in order to make sure that defendant understood
the deal. R. 3971 at 227:11-12. After defendant explained that he "wanted to get out
of jail that day," rather than serving additional time, Garcia went back to the
prosecutor and confirmed that the prosecutor would not agree to defendant's
immediate release. R. 3971 at 227:12. Garcia "did some calculating" to verify the
prosecutor's understanding of how long defendant had served, after which Garcia
personally negotiated the modified deal that ultimately allowed defendant to be
released immediately. R. 3971 at 227:12-14.
Although defendant now points out that Garcia could not remember the
precise statutory section to which defendant was pleading no contest, Aplt. Br. 36,
the record demonstrates that Garcia was well aware of the underlying charge. As
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discussed above, that statutory provision was identified twice in defendant's plea
statement, defendant signed a statement saying that he had reviewed the statement
with Garcia, and Garcia later specifically testified that he had not only reviewed that
plea agreement with defendant, but also that he had discussed the specific charges
with defendant. R. 3971 at 75-76, 80; 3971 at 226: 5; 3971 at 227:11-12.
Moreover, defendant's claim relies on a selective recitation of the facts
surrounding defense counsel's memory lapse. At the plea hearing, the parties
explained the plea to the court. At that point, the court asked counsel "[w]hat
section will he be charged under, do you know?" R. 3971 at 226:4. The prosecutor
responded that it would be "[sjection 76-10,1 believe it's 508, isn't it counsel?" R.
3971 at 226: 4-5. As indicated in defendant's brief, Garcia responded by saying "I
honestly don't know." R. 3971 at 226: 5. Garcia's next sentence, however, showed
that this was a momentary memory lapse, not evidence of faulty preparation: "I
looked at it a few days ago and I did not write it down, Judge." R. 3971 at 226: 5.
Thus, defendant only tells part of the story when he suggests that Garcia "did
not know" what section defendant was pleading no contest to violating. Aplt. Br.
36. What the record actually says is that although Garcia reviewed the code section
a few days before the hearing, discussed the case and the agreement with James
Valdez, reviewed the charges and plea agreement with defendant, and personally
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negotiated a series of modifications to the plea agreement itself, he had a
momentary memory lapse during the hearing. This isolated moment simply does
not establish that Garcia failed to review defendant's claim, nor does it overcome
the strong presumption that Garcia acted competently.
Second, defendant has not shown that he was prejudiced by either of the
alleged errors.

"Where a defendant challenges a guilty plea on grounds of

ineffective assistance of counsel, he or she must show 'a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's errors, he [or she] would not have pleaded guilty and would have
insisted on going to trial/" Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 525 (Utah 1994) (quoting
Hill v. Lockliart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). Therefore, counsel's deficient performance
must have "'affected the outcome of the plea process.'" Id. (citation omitted).
As discussed above, however, defendant's plea in this case was based on the
State's initial sentencing concessions, as well as its subsequent willingness to
approve defendant's immediate release. Thus, regardless of whether Garcia had
conducted an independent examination of the underlying facts and the precise
nature of this charge, the record still demonstrates that defendant would have
pleaded no contest in order to obtain his immediate release. Defendant's ineffective
assistance claim should therefore be rejected.
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II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN
IT ORDERED DEFENDANT'S SENTENCES IN CASE -4352 TO
RUN CONSECUTIVELY WITH EACH OTHER AND WITH THE
SENTENCE IN CASE -3971
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered the
sentences in case -4352 to run consecutively to each other and to the sentences
imposed in case -3971. Aplt. Br. 37-45. Defendant specifically claims that the trial
court abused its discretion by (1) failing to properly consider the number of victims
in this case, and (2) improperly considering a prior shooting. Aplt. Br. 37-45. Both
claims should be rejected.
A. The record does not support defendant's claim that the trial court
improperly considered the number of victims.
Defendant first claims that the trial court failed to properly consider the
number of victims prior to imposing consecutive sentences. Aplt. Br. 37-45. This
claim should be rejected.
A trial court's decision regarding consecutive or concurrent sentences is
governed by Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-401 (West 2004). Under § 76-3-401(2), a
court is required to "consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the
number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the
defendant 7 ' when making this decision.
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A defendant bears the burden of establishing error when he claims that the
trial court improperly weighed the § 76-3-401(2) factors. State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12,
1 ! 11,16, 40 P.3d 626; State v. Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 432, % 28, 82 P.3d 1167. A
defendant does not satisfy this burden by simply showing that a trial court was
silent regarding a particular factor. State v. Valdez, 2008 UT App 329, % 8,194 P.3d
195. Instead, sentences are affirmed as long as information regarding the contested
factor was properly before the trial court. See State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 652
(Utah App. 1997). Thus, if the record shows that the factor was discussed in the PSI
and that the trial court reviewed the PSI prior to sentencing, that is sufficient to
show that the trial court properly considered the factor. See Helms, 2002 UT 12, <[ 13;
Valdez, 2008 UT App 329, % 8; Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 432, ^

30-31.

In this case, the PSI specifically discussed the number of victims, and the PSI
was specifically discussed at sentencing. R. 4352 at 122: 3-4; 4352 at PSI: 6. The
record therefore shows that the trial court considered the number of victims prior to
sentencing defendant to consecutive sentences in case -4352.
Despite this, defendant claims that the court did not"properly" consider the
number of victims because the prosecutor stated that the "whole neighborhood"
was the victim during the sentencing hearing. Aplt. Br. 40. This claim should be
rejected for three reasons.
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First, there was nothing improper about the prosecutor's statement.
Defendant drove into a Salt Lake City neighborhood at 5 a.m., after which one of his
passengers began shooting from the vehicle at a neighborhood house. R. 4352 at
PSI: 3. Officers later found "several bullet holes in a vehicle" that was parked in
front of a home. R. 4352 at PSI: 3-4.
From these facts, it is clear this was not a targeted crime.

Defendant's

companion did not aim at a particular person, nor did he fire from a stable vantage
point during daylight hours. Instead, defendant's companion fired multiple rounds
into the dark from a moving vehicle. These stray bullets could have hit anyone from
the neighborhood who happened to be in the wrong place at this very wrong time.
Such a shooting would have had an undeniably striking impact—not only on the
owner of the vehicle that defendant's companion actually hit, but also on all the
other people in the neighborhood who walk those same streets and would now be
left wondering how to protect themselves and their children the next time defendant
or his friends decided to fire multiple shots from a moving vehicle.
Second, even if the prosecutor's statement was somehow improper,
defendant's claim fails because he has not shown that the trial court actually
considered that statement as a basis for its sentencing decision. As indicated above,
"'the burden is on [the defendant] to show that the trial court did not properly
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consider all the factors in section 76-3-401 (4)/" Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 432, % 28
(quoting Helms, 2002 UT 12, ^f 16). This burden extends to cases in which a
defendant claims that the trial court considered improper information. In State v.
Alfatlawi, for example, the defendant claimed that his consecutive sentences were
improper because the trial court had considered his ''race and nationality during the
sentencing hearing." 2006 UT App 511, f 48,153 P.3d 804. This Court rejected that
claim, however, because the defendant had "failed to demonstrate that the trial
court was actually motivated by bias in its sentencing determination." Id. at % 49.
Thus, there is a difference between a trial court simply being aware of a
statement and a trial court actively relying on the statement as a basis for
sentencing. While defendant correctly notes that appellate courts assume that a trial
court considered a statutory factor if it is set forth in the PSI, Aplt. Br. 42, appellate
courts also expressly allow trial courts to disregard individual factors if the
circumstances of an individual case warrant it. Under this rule, trial courts retain
the discretion to attach different weight to the different factors, and trial courts are
expressly allowed to place one factor over the all the others if the circumstances
warrant. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 2006 UT App 420, ^ 31, 147 P.3d 497. Thus,
"[o]ne factor in mitigation or aggravation may weigh more than several factors on
the opposite scale." State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188,192 (Utah 1990).
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In this case, although the trial court clearly heard the prosecutor refer to the
"whole neighborhood" as the victim of the crime, R. 4352 at 122: 6, the trial court
never referred to that statement during the sentencing hearing. R. 4352 at 122:1-7.
Instead, the court only offered one explanation for its sentence: that defendant was
"an extreme danger to any community that he happens to be in." R. 4352 at 122: 6.
This was a clear reference to defendant's character, which is also a factor under § 763-401(2). Thus, even if the court did consider the prosecutor's statement regarding
the number of victims, that statement ultimately proved irrelevant because the court
based its decision on a different factor entirely. Defendant is therefore incorrect
when he claims that the trial court improperly considered the number of victims.
Third, even if the trial court did improperly consider the prosecutor's
statement, defendant still has not shown that there was an abuse of discretion. "The
imposition of a sentence rests entirely within the discretion of the trial court, within
the limits prescribed by law." Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651 (quotations and citation
omitted). "Abuse of discretion may be manifest if the actions of the judge in
sentencing were inherently unfair or if the judge imposed a clearly excessive
sentence." State v. Montoya, 929 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah App. 1996) (quotations and
citation omitted). It is therefore settled that a court only abuses its discretion when
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"no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court." Id.; accord
State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, % 12, 84 P.3d 854; Schweitzer, 943 R2d at 651.
As discussed above, the court sentenced defendant to consecutive sentences
because of its conclusion that defendant was "an extreme danger to any community
that he happens to be in." R. 4352 at 122: 6. This conclusion was amply supported
by the record. Defendant admitted that he was the driver during a drive-by
shooting. R. 4352 at 121: 9. After a concerned neighbor followed him out of the
neighborhood and called police, defendant led officers on a high speed chase at
speeds that reached 125 to 130 mph.

R. 4352 at PSI: 3-4. During that chase,

defendant intentionally rammed his car into a police car, and he was only stopped
after officers performed the pit maneuver on him. R. 4352 at PSI: 3-4. Rather than
submitting at that point, defendant ran away, and he was only apprehended after
officers tased him twice. R. 4352 at PSI: 3-4.
While this crime alone showed that defendant was an "extreme danger to any
community that he happens to be in," defendant's criminal history only amplified
that conclusion. R. 4352 at 122: 6. Defendant committed this crime while awaiting
sentencing on the charges in case -3971. As explained above, that crime occurred
when defendant and his companions fired into a crowd of people in a parking lot.
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But this is not all. As set forth in the PSI, defendant had also been involved in
17 criminal incidents since 1997. R. 4352 at PSI: 6-7. In fact, his criminal history in
Utah has been serious enough that he was at one time officially listed as Public
Enemy Number One. R. 4352 at PSI: 6. In addition, at the time of these incidents,
defendant was a fugitive from charges in Washington state. R. 4352 at PSI: 6. After
being jailed on these charges, defendant was charged with two different jailhouse
rule infractions that occurred while awaiting sentencing: in the first, defendant was
charged with disorderly conduct; in the second, he was charged with not following
orders from jail staff. R. 4352 at PSI: 5.
In State v. Nuttall, this Court held that a trial court may order consecutive
sentences to "protect society from an individual deemed to be a danger to the
community." 861 P.2d 454,458 (Utah App. 1993). In Montoya, this Court therefore
affirmed a court's decision to order consecutive sentences where a known gang
member committed a violent crime while on probation. 929 P.3d at 358-60.
Given the indiscriminate, violent nature of this crime, defendant's willingness
to participate in a drive-by shooting while awaiting sentencing on another charge,
defendant's willingness to assault a police officer during a high speed chase, and
defendant's extensive criminal history, defendant simply cannot show that no
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reasonable person would have concluded that consecutive sentences were
appropriate. Defendant's claim should be rejected.
B. The record does not support defendant's claim that the trial court
improperly considered the prior shooting.
Defendant next claims that the trial court abused its discretion "by considering
information that was not reasonably relevant or reliable." Aplt. Br. 41. According
to defendant, the trial court "considered other incidents described by the
prosecutor," including a prior shooting in which a young neighborhood girl had
been hit. Aplt. Br. 41. This claim should be rejected for two reasons.
First, as with the comment discussed above in Point II. A, the record does not
support defendant's claim that the trial court actually considered this comments.
The trial court did not refer to it during the sentencing hearing. R. 4352 at 122:1-7.
Instead, the trial court only referred to the fact that defendant was "an extreme
danger to any community that he happens to be in." R. 4352 at 122: 6. Although
defendant speculates that this statement may have been a reference to the
prosecutor's comment, nothing in the record supports that speculation. Absent such
evidence, defendant has not satisfied his burden of showing that this ruling was
actually based on improper information. Defendant's claim should be rejected for
this reason alone.

49

Second, even if the trial court did rely on this statement, and even if it was not
reasonably reliable, the sentence was still appropriate because the evidence that was
before the court supported the sentence. In State v. Scott, the defendant similarly
claimed that his sentence was based on unreliable information. 2008 UT A p p 68,
f 12,180 P.3d 774. Although this Court ultimately concluded that the challenged
information was sufficiently reliable, this Court affirmed the sentence because "the
remaining cumulative evidence clearly supports Defendant's sentence." Id. In
Alfatlawi, this Court likewise concluded that the defendant had "failed to
demonstrate any prejudice resulting from the alleged errors'7 because the admissible
evidence still"weigh[ed] heavily in favor of consecutive sentencing." 2006 UT App
511, | 51.
As set forth above, the trial court in this case concluded that defendant was an
extreme danger to the community —a conclusion amply supported by the
indiscriminate shooting in this case, the indiscriminate shooting in case -3971, the 17
prior criminal incidents that defendant has been involved with, and the two
jailhouse infractions that defendant incurred in the months prior to sentencing.
Thus, even if the trial court had improperly considered the prosecutor's reference to
a prior shooting, defendant's claim should still be rejected because he has not shown
that he was prejudiced by the prosecutor's improper statement.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
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